A case study of industrial relations in a commercial bank illustrates the way in which management can effectively resolve complicated industrial relations problems by clarifying its objectives and pursuing them against odds. The bank moved from a tension ridden industrial relations situation to a situation of bipartite relations and a genuine concern for each other's points of view. It is argued that industrial relations problems will be much less insoluble than they appear on the surface if there is willingness and ability to take clear-headed, goal-oriented decisions. Problems of trade unionism and industrial relations are increasingly becoming an anathema to the managers and administrators in our country. On the one hand, management thinking is moving towards long and shortrange planning and control of management tasks in the context of clearly defined objectives and environmental constraints. On the other hand, the tasks of dealing with trade unions and employees appear to be getting farther and farther away from managers interested in systematic planning and control. If you ask an Indian manager the reasons for this perceived managerial disability, he will stress the vyidely held belief that trade unions in the country largely play to the tunes of political leadership involved in inter-group rivalries and conflicts, creating all kinds of uncertainties and confusion in the achievement of managerial tasks. He will also stress the potential and actual interference by government and its administrative agencies in the field of labour-management relations. In most cases, the manager is likely to strike a note of despair, with the observation that his efforts in systematic managerial planning and control are upset by his inability to plan or control employee relations.
Problems of trade unionism and industrial relations are increasingly becoming an anathema to the managers and administrators in our country. On the one hand, management thinking is moving towards long and shortrange planning and control of management tasks in the context of clearly defined objectives and environmental constraints. On the other hand, the tasks of dealing with trade unions and employees appear to be getting farther and farther away from managers interested in systematic planning and control. If you ask an Indian manager the reasons for this perceived managerial disability, he will stress the vyidely held belief that trade unions in the country largely play to the tunes of political leadership involved in inter-group rivalries and conflicts, creating all kinds of uncertainties and confusion in the achievement of managerial tasks. He will also stress the potential and actual interference by government and its administrative agencies in the field of labour-management relations. In most cases, the manager is likely to strike a note of despair, with the observation that his efforts in systematic managerial planning and control are upset by his inability to plan or control employee relations. 1 In a broad sense, one can distinguish two discrete methods of dealing with workers and trade unions on the part of management. One is the classical method, stressing management's obligation to run an organization economically and hence the managerial privilege to adopt an "authoritarian" or "tough" attitude towards labour. The other is the "modern" method, emphasizing the human element in the labour problem and hence a consultative, participative approach towards workers and trade unions. Such a participative approach is believed to lead to peace and harmony in industrial relations, which in turn are supposed to result in greater realization of organizational objectives. In practice, each manager (or management) adopts an approach which can be placed somewhere between the extreme forms of these two approaches. As a result of continuous academic and popular discussions on this issue of managerial style, managers appear to be increasingly concerned about locating their position along .the authoritarian-participative continuum.
Such concern among managers to find a place on the continuum implies over-simplification of managerial tasks. From the manager's point of view, the value of a style or approach in any area of management should be understood in the light of the specific objectives set for him and the specific situation with which he deals with at a given time. This latter factor, the specific situation, is created not merely by the manager's plans or actions, but by the plans and actions of other groups in the environment.
In analytical terms, the structure of industrial relations in an organization is a resultant of the interaction" of forces generated internally as well as externally. The external forces are many and varied, e.g., trade unions, government agencies, labour legislation, economic environment, and political environment. In a period of relative stability when the existing arrangement is not significantly challenged, we may describe the industrial relations structure as being in a state of equilibrium. This state of equilibrium will continue until one or more of the agencies mentioned above exerts pressure on the structure. Applying this framework from the management point of view, if pressure is exerted by an agency other than the management, the latter will have to respond to the new situation. The response will be governed by the management's assumptions regarding the new situation and its significance for managerial tasks. The assumptions made by the management may be based on adequate knowledge of the new situation or they may be based on management's beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices about the factors involved. For instance, a management may withhold any clear response to a new union out of the belief that trade unions are politically engineered organizations and the corresponding assumptions that unions block achievement of the objective of organizational efficiency. On this-assumption, the management may be drawn to the conclusion that it is necessary for it to neutralize the influence of unions over workers to achieve organizational objectives. Similarly, when workers begin a strike or agitation, some management may develop a fear of the disruptive opportunity available to workers and hence assume that they cannot easily control the situation, while others may feel competent to deal with the hostile situation.
Our study suggests the hypothesis that those managements whose assumptions and responses are based on objective understanding of the forces underlying them will be able to restore the organizational balance of industrial relations more effectively than those whose assumptions are based on stereotypes, uncritical beliefs, and prejudices. Moreover, the management's attempt to restore balance will be more effective if it pursues immediate or short-term objectives. We shall examine this hypothesis with the help of data on the managerial response to an industrial relations situation in a banking organization. In our judgement, although our analysis is based on a single case study, it helps us to draw some lessons of general importance regarding identification of an effective approach to the labour problem in industry. The data presented below are based partly on recorded information available in the organization and partly on our interviews with a cross-section of the bank's management, employees, and trade union leaders. All names of people and places as well as the dates mentioned are fictitious. Most of the bank's clerical and junior supervisory staff were drawn from the local lower-middle class families. For these jobs, the management usually preferred matriculates over graduates, because, in their opinion, the former would be more motivated for hard work than the latter who might expect high salaries for their "education." Most of the employees were also drawn from among the acquaintances and relatives of the bank's senior executives. The management believed that such employees developed a sense of gratitude towards the management for offering them prized jobs. Consequently, the employer-employee relations in the bank were characterized by networks of social bonds across the organizational hierarchy rather than entirely by the contract of employment. These social bonds were expected to discourage the employees from indulging in union activities for a considerably long period. Although unionization among bank employees in the country began in 1946-47, the employees of Anjali Bank made no serious attempt to unionize until 1960.
Industrial Relations in Anjali Bank

Unionization
In 1950, Roy, a cromptist in the head office was transferred following a heated argu-2 This paper draws information from "Anjali Bank (A), (B), and (C)" case series prepared by B.C. Shah, N. R. Sheth, and Gopal Krishna for Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. We gratefully acknowledge the collaboration of Mr. Gopal Krishna who assiduously collected the data, and indirect help from a large number of participants of training programmes where this case was used.
3 Clerical and subordinate staff covered under the various tribunal awards relating to employment conditions is known as award staff. ment with the chief accountant on implementation of a tribunal award. Roy tried to form a union in 1951 but secured little response from his colleagues. Subsequently, he left the bank's service and successfully formed the Anjali Bank's Employees Union which was later affiliated to the National Federation of Bank Workers.
Most employees were initially reluctant to join the union because of their personal relations with bank executives and the fear of victimization. Eventually, however, the employees felt the need of unionism for various reasons. In 1960-61, when the union was formed, only 60 out of nearly 1,100 employees in the award staff joined it. By 1963 the union could enroll only 25% of the award staff.
However, several intra-organizational factors as well as happenings outside the organization created the need for unionization among the employees. In the first place, unionism was steadily growing among bank employees elsewhere.* One vital ground for this growth of unionism was the employees' common experience of harsh treatment (irregular working hours, low salaries, indiscriminate assignment of duties) at the hands of employers. These environmental forces gradually influenced Anjali Bank employees who began to become aware of the harsh treatment they received from the management. The contractual aspect of the management-worker relationship thus became effective in spite of the social bonds between them.
Within the organization, the management planned for fast expansion of the bank. Most of the 125 new branches opened between 1950 and 1965 were located outside the home region, especially in far away places such as Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
Many employees were therefore transferred from their home regions to distant places. Hence the management lost control over the activities of such employees and the social influence which it could exercise on them through familial and friendship ties. Moreover, many employees felt that transfers and promotions were made on the basis of personal influence rather than according to a set of well-laid principles. The rapid expansion of the bank forced the management to recruit officers directly as all new positions in officers' cadres could not be filled by promotion of clerks. Consequently, the clerical employees lost hopes of promotion. On the other hand they were required to work harder to cope with the expanding work loads. They felt that the management did not adequately appreciate their contribution to the programme of expansion. This led to a sense of rivalry and hostility between officers and award staff at the branch level. The rivalry and hostility were expressed through stories of victimization by branch managers among clerical employees. All these factors relating to the processes within the organization contributed to a relatively easy acceptance of trade unionism among the employees. In 1965, the union commanded membership of nearly 80% of the award staff.
Initial Response from Management
In the beginning the management was indifferent to the union and its activities. The union raised demands on matters such as salaries and allowances, leave salary, medical aid, provident fund, gratuity, bonus, and promotions. The management was unwilling to enter into direct negotiations with the union and hence decided not to respond to the several letters they received from the union asking for recognition.
In February 1965, the UP State unit of the union complained to the government's labour department that the management had victimized union leaders and active workers by transferring them to various branches. The employees observed pendown strike for eight days in protest against such transfers. The management's contention was that the transfers were required by the exigencies of business. As a result of conciliation proceedings the management agreed to withdraw the transfer orders in question and not to take any disciplinary action against those who had joined the strike. The union, on its part, apologized for using offensive language against the management and agreed to compensate for the period of strike by working overtime without additional remuneration.
On October 15, 1965, an officer of the Kanpur branch objected to the use of the office telephone by a union official for union activities. Later, the union alleged that the union leader was insulted and assaulted by the officer. This incident sparked off an agitation by the employees at Kanpur as well as those in the neighbouring branches. Consequently, the management suspended several employees and terminated the union leader's services on the ground of indiscipline.
Let us understand why the management showed utter indifference to the fact of unionism and the union's request for recognition as well as bilateral negotiations of employees'demands. Such a response to an emerging trade union is fairly common among managements in our country. We know several cases of professional managers adopting such an attitude towards the emerging reality of trade unionism. While in our country there is no obligation on management to recognize a trade union for collective bargaining (except under the code of discipline and some state legislation with limited applicability), it is well known that a trade union in a democratic society like ours is a legally, socially, and politically accepted fact of life.
Why then do managers try to shy away from effectively recognizing this fact of life as long as they can get away with it? This is a complex question and it is unnecessary for us to deal with it exhaustively in the present analysis. However, the response to trade unionism made by the management of Anjali Bank makes sense if we examine closely the background of employer-employee relations within this organization. The familial and other social bonds prevailing between bank executives and employees clearly reflect an urge for security on both sides. In fact many organizations still insist on only known persons being recruited to protect themselves from any potential dishonesty among workers of the perceived nuisance of unionism. In sueh a situation, when the management is confronted with trade unionism along with all the economic and other demands as well as charges of victimization and favouritism, as it happened in the present case, it is likely to get baffled and develop hostility towards the union. For instance, a manager such as the chief executive of Anjali Bank might well ask: Why do the employees need to turn towards unionism while the management is interested in their well-being and willing to solve their problems? With this sort of questions in his mind the manager may conclude that it is not only the management's privilege but also its obligation to keep the trade union at bay as long as he can manage to do so. This attitude is usually labelled as an aspect of paternalism, but those of us who criticize such a managerial approach may do well to understand the organizational and situational forces operating behind such an approach. As it happened at the initial stage of the preceding story of Anjali Bank, the management in such situations adopts an attitude of indifference or hostility towards unionism, perhaps in the hope that it would wither away as a result of such an attitude.
At the same time one may wonder how enlightened managers tend to overlook the simple fact of our industrial relations structure that the management can hardly avoid or postpone confrontation with an emerging trade union. Our labour legislation provides for government intervention at the request of either party in an industrial dispute. Under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the management is compelled to meet the trade union on a reference of the dispute by the union to the government labour department. The implication of this is that managements often throw away the opportunity to build a bipartite relationship with the trade union when the latter asks for it but soon get involved in such negotiations at the instance of a third party. In many cases the crucial fallout of this compulsion is that the two parties involved in industrial relations begin on a note of mutual distrust and perhaps of hostility. A relationship that begins with such attitudes is unlikely to lead to effective bipartite understanding between the management and the union.
Beginning of a Dialogue
Within a month of the disciplinary action against some employees at Kanpur, the management decided to open bilateral negotiations with the union. On November 29, 1965, the management invited the union for a meeting at Calcutta to discuss mutual problems. At this meeting, the management agreed to withdraw all the suspension orders served on the agitating employees, and the union agreed to withdraw all agitation and help the management in restoring normalcy of work at all the branches. Both the parties also agreed to abide by the code of discipline adopted by the Indian Labour Conference.
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Subsequently the management and the union held four joint meetings between December 1965 and May 1966 to settle all outstanding issues. At the first two meetings, the parties reiterated their decision to forget the past and develop cordial relations based on give-andtake. The union reiterated its offer of help in restoring normalcy of work. In turn, the management conceded to the employees' demand relating to wages, allowances, and other working conditions, apart from agreeing to withdraw disciplinary proceedings against some employees who were alleged to have misbehaved. Meanwhile, the union raised a dispute on the annual bonus for 1963. It asked for 87% of the available surplus of profit as defined by law, as against 27% offered by the management. This dispute was then referred to an industrial tribunal for adjudication. The next two meetings concluded without agreement on substantive issues regarding allowances and working conditions. The management pressed for a formal grievance procedure, but the union demanded its postponement. The union kept on raising the dispute on bonus although it had been referred to a tribunal for adjudication. The two parties accused each other of inaction and unwillingness to establish cordial relations. The union representatives refused to sign the minutes of the fourth meeting.
From these facts, it appears that at the preliminary meeting both parties had decided to relent from their earlier positions and hence they undertook to help each other in building an effective bilateral relationship. The discussions that followed in later joint meetings, however, tell a different story. The evidence regarding the first two meetings suggests that while the two parties kept up their apparent urge to help each other, the union had in fact clinched a number of concessions from the management without offering much in return except promises of good intentions in terms of restoration of normalcy in the bank's branches affected by staff agitation following the telephone incident at Kanpur. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the substantive issue of bonus could not be solved at the joint meetings, and in fact the management clearly said that this issue should be left to be sorted out by government adjudication.
The happenings at the third and fourth joint meetings clearly indicate that the apparent offer of mutual help and cooperation in the earlier meetings was rather spurious and that the parties were perhaps waiting for a major showdown. At the later meetings the management and the union began to play a win-lose game. For instance, when the management brought in the issue of a grievance procedure, the union tried to excuse itself by asking for postponement of a decision and in turn demanded that its economic demand should be settled before other issues could be discussed. Perhaps the same spirit prevailed in the management's anxiety over restoration of normalcy in the branches and the union's unwillingness to sign the minutes of the fourth meeting.
Management of Conflict
Meanwhile the hostility between officers and clerical employees at the branch level continued to grow. Apparently, a win-lose game was being played at that level also, as one can judge from the accusations and counter-accusations made by the two groups during the period of reconciliation as reported later. On May 10, 1966, two employees of the Chowringhee branch in Calcutta approached the accountant in his office, shouted at him, thumped his desk, and in abusive language demanded withdrawal of notices served on some of their colleagues for indiscipline. The management consequently charge-sheeted and suspended these two employees. The local branch of the union wrote to the head office for immediate withdrawal of the charge-sheet against the two employees. The management remained firm and dismissed them on June 6 after a departmental inquiry. This dismissal sparked off an agitation by the union leaders and other employees of the Chowringhee branch. The employees at Lucknow, Meerut, Kanpur, and other branches joined the agitation and refused to do their normal work, shouted slogans during office hours, harassed the officers, assaulted women employees, marched in processions to the houses of the branch managers, and threatened them and their families with violent action. On some occasions, the agitating employees and their leaders publicly questioned the solvency of the bank.
This outburst among employees can be understood as a precipitating event of the chain process of conflict that was progressively building up over the months. It is difficult to figure out whether an adequate awareness on the part of management of what was happening in the branches could have prevented the final showdown between the parties. However, it seems that the union and the employees had now become so agitated and anxious to retaliate against the management at all levels that they began to indulge in radical action including physical violence in the name of trade union activity. As we have described earlier.
employees assaulted male as well as female officers, disrupted normal banking work and, to top it all, publicly questioned the solvency of the bank. For any banking organization the rumour about its solvency is a matter of life and death. In short, the union indulged in activities that were not only beyond the scope of normal democratic trade unionism but clearly aimed at scandalizing the organization and physically harassing the officers.
In otir understanding, this situation provided to the management a turning point in their thinking and approach towards the union. As the chief executive mentioned to us, he realized the anti-organizational as well as antisocial implications of the action adopted by the union and hence regarded it as his managerial as well as social obligation to teach an effective lesson to the union leadership. At this stage, the chief executive thought he owed it to his organization as well as to the society to fight a war against the union which had indulged in criminal activities. In his view, such a war would also help the management to remove the current uncertainties in industrial relations and achieve some stability in the long run.
When one decides to fight a war one needs to think of all its aspects and work out his strategy to ensure effective success. Accordingly, the chief executive realized the primary need to take his board of directors into confidence so that he might continue to receive the necessary support from his colleagues as he went along. The board assured full support to the chief executive.
Following agitation at various branches, the concerned branch managers charge-sheeted and suspended more than a hundred employees. They asked several senior officers at the head office to conduct inquiries against the suspended employees. As the employees concerned decided to boycott these inquiries with the approval of their union, the inquiries were held ex-parte and the employees were dismissed from service. Concurrently, officers from the head office were deputed to carry out the normal business of the branches which were affected by the large scale dismissal of employees. One major asset in the management's armoury was the hostility between officers and employees at the branch level. This hostility helped it not only to maintain the banking service but also to strengthen the loyalty of officers to management. The ruthless dismissal of about a hundred employees was possible mainly due to the unreserved support from officers.
Similarly, the mangement sought help from the state's legal machinery to make it clear to the union and employees that they could not get away with transgressing the limits of legitimate trade union activity. On June 20,1966, the management filed a civil suit at Calcutta against the union and the employees who had violated the code of discipline and indulged in illegal agitation, disrupting the normal banking operation. The charges against the employees included 1) abusing female and male officers, 2) circulating defamatory statements against the management, 3) spreading rumours against the solvency of the bank, and 4) entering bank premises without reason and causing damage to bank property, destroying and tampering with the bank's documents and records. The court granted an interim injunction against the union and the concerned employees, preventing them from shouting slogans, holding meetings and demonstrations within fifty yards of the bank's premises, disfiguring the premises with posters, obstructing customers from entering the bank, and circulating defamatory statements against the management. The union contested the injunction and claimed immunity against legal action in terms of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 6 and the freedom of speech and action guaranteed under the Indian Constitution. 7 On July 20, 1966, the court confirmed the interim injunction issued earfier.
While the agitation was in progress, the management and the union issued circulars 6 Section 18 of the Indian Trade Unions Act (1926) grants immunity from legal proceedings to members of trade unions for any action in promotion of a trade dispute on the ground of breach of contract of service.
7 Article 19 of the Constitution of India guarantees to all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peacefully, to form association, etc. from time to time explaining and justifying their respective positions on various matters and disputes between them. The union alleged that the management was unwilling to discuss the issue of bonus for the period 1957-65. According to the union, although necessary calculations were confirmed by an independent expert, the management maintained that there was no available surplus for distribution. The union's decision to launch an agitation was alleged to have been provoked by what it called intransigence on the part of management. The union also demanded that there should be no further direct recruitment of officers and that all employees with more than six months' service should be confirmed. The union alleged that the management was trying to confuse the employees by encouraging a rival union. The union warned the members against the mangement's attempts to divert their attention from the real issues by invoking the code of discipline. In another circular, the union asked its members to join the agitation launched by the employees at Calcutta by refusing overtime work, demonstrating during business hours, and organizing collective casual leave to paralyse the bank's work. On the other hand, the management issued circulars reiterating its position that it would negotiate the issue of bonus only after the decision of the industrial tribunal was known. It warned the union and employees that the agitation launched by them was illegal and unwarranted.
On the other hand, the chief executive decided to keep the central government fully informed of the day-to-day developments on the strike. A senior executive of the bank was posted in Delhi and acted as a liaison officer with the ministry of labour. The branch managers at Lucknow, Calcutta, Kanpur, and other centres sent daily telegrams to the central government's chief labour commissioner narrating the harassment they suffered at the hands of the agitating employees. The management clearly explained to the government the need for strong action against the union especially as it had violated the code of discipline. Consequently the chief labour commissioner issued a warning to the union that it might have to face strong action for violation of the code of discipline.
This managerial action signifies a remarkable foresight in a situation of total conflict. The liaison work was done so thoroughly that the chief labour commissioner felt compelled to threaten the union with punitive action for violating the code of discipline, although this code has no legal sanction behind it.
On August 10, 1966, the National 1 Federation of Bank Workers decided to intervene in the dispute and tried to bring the two parties together. The federation met one of the previous chief executives of the bank and persuaded him to reach an agreement with the union. Subsequently, the federation issued a circular stating that mutually agreed formula had been evolved for resolving the dispute between the management and the union. However, the management promptly clarified that no agreement had yet been reached with the union as reported in the federation's circular. The management emphasized that the strike was illegal and that the employees guilty of offensive behaviour would be dealt with according to the normal procedure of law. On the other hand, a professional management organization sent an appeal to the government urging it not to institute any legal proceedings against the employees of Anjali Bank charged with indiscipline. This organization tried to resolve the dispute by appointing a commission to go into the matter. However, the management firmly opposed this move on the ground that an external agency could not interfere in the activities of the bank. The federation also tried to bring pressure on the management by asking its members in other banks to boycott the instruments of Anjali Bank in all types of inter-bank activity. However, the Anjali Bank management successfully sought the intervention of the Reserve Bank and scotched the union's attempts to disrupt normal banking work. Thus the management showed a great degree of resilience and clarity of purpose in refusing to succumb to the pressures exerted by outside agencies to resolve the conflict prematurely. The chief executive men-tioned to us that when he and his colleagues made up their minds to bring the guilty trade unionists to book they had decided to face squarely all the consequences. It would not matter much to the management if the bank had to be closed down some time, but they could not tolerate anti-social and unethical actions on the part of employees.
Eventually the management realized that the morale of the employees who were dismissed was breaking down. The union had collected funds from the public to support the situation but these funds were soon getting exhausted, and hence many employees were getting restless as they felt the pinch of deprivation of regular income. It was then clear to the management that the union could not sustain the agitation for a long time. Ultimately on August 20, 1966, the chief executive of the bank accepted the request of the general secretary of the Anjali Bank union as well as the secretary of the national federation for a meeting. At this meeting the two sides reached an agreement to the effect that the federation would be associated with the Anjali Bank union in all negotiations with the management for one year. It was also agreed that correspondence regarding any grievance or dispute could be carried on between the management and the central office of the union and that the federation would also remain in the picture. It was further agreed that all correspondence on policy matters would be routed through the federation. All these negotiations were held at the request of the union so that the management continued to have an upper hand in dealing with the union's demands.
Towards Reconciliation
So the "war" was won by the management, and it was almost a total victory. However, the ticklish issue of dismissal of nearly a hundred employees in various branches had yet to be resolved, apart from the substantive economic and other demands made by the union. In such a situation, some managements may be overwhelmed by their success and continue their anti-union posture, perhaps in the hope that they may succeed in getting rid of union trouble for ever; others may begin to feel guilty of their earlier harshness and try to compensate for it by trying to please the union and employees. In the case of Anjali Bank, however, the strategy followed by the management after the conflict was a strategy based on clear managerial objectives. If the management wanted to teach a lesson to the erring union, the lesson had been well taught by August 1966. However, teaching a lesson to the union or employees was not the primary objective of the management. The primary objective was to maintain and promote organizational efficiency and this could be done only with the help and co-operation of the employees as well as the union. In this context, the period immediately following the settlement of August 1966 marked the second major turning point in the history of industrial relations in Anjali Bank. There were two major issues left to be resolved at that stage; The first was the need to re-establish the working relationship between the officers and the Workers at the branch level. The second was to take the final managerial decisions regarding the dismissed employees in view of the need to re-establish normal relations. One way to harmonize the relations at the branch level would have been to send out circulars from the management as well as the union once again expressing promises of hopes and mutual cooperation. However, the Anjali Bank management as well as the union leadership realized that they would not be able to settle the issues at the branch level unless they personally visited the affected branches, met the people, understood their problems, and found ways to re-establish the organizational relationships. In this spirit, the chief executive of the bank and the general secretary of the federation jointly visited Lucknow, Calcutta, Allahabad, and other branches and met the managers, officers, and the dismissed employees of these branches to know at first hand the reasons which prompted the individual acts of indiscipline and the subsequent agitation. At Kanpur, for instance, the chief executive met the branch managers. They described the various acts of indiscipline like disobedience to supervisors tampering with records, delays in completing documents, and discourtesy to customers. At the same time the federation's general secretary held talks separately with the dismissed and other employees. They complained that the overtime wages were paid unnecessarily and that laxity in office discipline was due to reluctance of officers to enforce discipline. They also complained of discrimination in granting leave and in distributing work among the employees. Many employees were allegedly advised by branch managers not to join the union.
Later there was a joint meeting of branch managers and employees with the chief executive and the general secretary. The chief executive emphasized that it was pointless to make charges and countercharges and that it would be more fruitful to make corrections where the employees had gone wrong. The general secretary emphasized that all disputes must be resolved through constitutional methods and there was no room for personal abuses in trade union activity. He said that the employees were part and parcel of the organization and should not indulge in acts which were harmful to the industry.
On May 15, 1967, the chief executive, the general secretary, and the managers of the affected branches met in Delhi to discuss the question of reinstatement of the dismissed employees. In the first place, the chief executive met the branch managers. All the branch managers at the meeting opposed the reinstatement. The chief executive pointed out that there would be no permanent peace unless they reached an understanding with the union. The only alternative to a negotiated settlement was protracted litigation which was not conducive to harmonious industrial relations.
The branch managers agreed to enforce whatever decision the head office took but pleaded for fixing the responsibility for discipline on the union and urged for a change in union leadership. It was also suggested that some dismissed employees who wanted to resign should be allowed to resign. There was also a consensus that no salary should be paid for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of possible reinstatement and that the general secretary of the federation should be requested to submit a list of employees who should be reinstated so that the bank was not open to any charge of discrimination.
The chief executive then had a separate meeting with the general secretary and conveyed to him the strong feeling among the branch managers against reinstatement of all dismissed employees. He therefore advised him to prepare the union for the unpleasant reality. However, the general secretary appealed for reinstatement of dismissed employees and agreed that the reinstated employees would not claim wages for the period of dismissal.
Then there was a meeting of all the parties : the chief executive, the general secretary, and the branch managers. The branch managers complained that there was not much improvement in the attitude of the employees and that they continued to make unfounded allegations against the management.
The general secretary stressed the need for a negotiated settlement of the dispute in the interest of lasting industrial peace. He pleaded that the management should take some calculated risk by reinstating the dismissed employees. The meeting was then addressed by the chief executive who advocated a practical approach to the entire question. He said that no external agency could guarantee discipline in the bank and that it could be ensured only by the management and the employees working together towards that end.
The above data suggest that the management in consultation with the union and the federation had clearly laid out a strategy to bring about genuine understanding betweer the two parties, especially at the grass-roots level. It was realized that both the employees as well as the branch managers had grievances against one another and that many psychological barriers existed between them in view of the previous incidents of abuses and assaults. Hence the chief executive requested the union leader to meet the employees without his intervention and he in turn met the branch managers without the union leader's intervention. This approach allowed an opportunity to both the parties to let out their grievances and complaints without fear. Only after this foundation was prepared, they held joint meeting between managers and employees. Once again people were allowed to ventilate their respective grievances and at the same time understand the viewpoints of one another. In this background, both the chief executive as well as the union leader admitted that mistakes were made on both sides but that it was now necessary to open the way to a new relationship of trust and goodwill between the two groups to serve their mutual interests. This strategy is by any standard worthy of being designated as decision making by joint consultation. It is important to note that the top management realized that while the problem of industrial relations had to be dealt with at the head office, these problems arose mainly among managers and workers at the branch level. Hence such problems could be effectively solved only by taking into confidence the people at the branch level. The managerial strategy for promotion of cooperation among managers and workers matched very well their strategy for handling a situation of total conflict during the earlier period. In both cases, there was a clear organizational purpose behind the decisions taken by the management.
Settlement of Substantive Issues
V Finally let us examine the managerial approach to the solution of the cases of the dismissed employees. In the context of the managerial urge to re-establish normal relations with the employees, it would have been unrealistic to expect the union to accept dismissal of about a hundred employees. Hence, at the request of the "union, the chief executive agreed to consider the cases of dismissed employees sympathetically. However, he decided not to hasten through any decision as he still wanted to make it clear to the union and the employees that they could not get away with destructive activities. The union leader was asked to make a representation to the board of directors on behalf of the dismissed employees. The board appointed a negotiating committee including four of its members and the federation's general secretary to examine the relevant issues. The committee recommended reinstatement of dismissed employees. The board, however, decided not to reinstate some ten employees who had indulged in extreme types of violence. The union leader found it somewhat difficult to accept this decision on punishment to the employees but he was left with no other choice. During our discussion with the management on this issue of punishment we were told that they had no intention to exercise vengeance or victimization against any employee. However, in the management's judgement the punishment inflicted was absolutely essential so that the painful lessons of the long agitation and strike were not lost on the people concerned. A clear indication of the management's positive attitude towards all employees is provided by the fact that those who were eligible for promotion according to the existing policy were promoted regardless of their involvement in the agitation. The statement made by one of the officers to the effect that the employees were ultimately their own colleagues and friends is a tribute to the sense of balance with which the Anjali Bank management fought a ruthless "war" when it was managerially essential but soon moved towards reconciliation to build up a lasting relationship with the same people against whom the "war" was conducted.
Conclusions
The foregoing story of labour relations in Anjali Bank and our analysis of the story lead us to some general observations regarding management of industrial conflict.
In a democratic society such as ours, a trade union is a legally and socially legitimized organization expected to promote and protect the legitimate economic, social, and political interests of workers, which are as important as .1, No.1, January 1976 those of the management. However, in view of the political and ideological overtones of trade unionism, managers are reluctant to accept trade unionism among their employees. While some managers publicly express willingness to accept trade unions, in practice they develop an attitude of apathy or aversion towards the unions. Others suffer from a fear complex in their dealings with trade unions, especially if the latter adopt a radical ideology. In many cases, the militant approach adopted by trade unions is in fact a response to the initial managerial attitude towards them (Dayal) . In the background of such psychological barriers, when management and trade unions are compelled to enter bilateral negotiations under government supervision, their relationship assumes the form of a win-lose struggle rather than one of mutual understanding and bargaining between equals. Management is often worried about the possibility of the union becoming strong and powerful if it is allowed to establish a bargaining relationship. Hence the management's strategy with regard to the union is to avoid it as far as possible. On the other hand, some managements are concerned about the potential threat posed by the unions and consequently adopt a policy of appeasement of the union, as it seems to have happened during the initial joint meetings between the parties in the Anjali Bank. Both these responses reflect concern with short-term objectives and a short-sighted approach to fulfilment of objectives.
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However, in such a situation the union may get over-enthusiastic about clinching concessions from management. As long as the union operates within the legal and ethical limits of unionism, management may gradually get over the initial fear complex and establish an effective bargaining relationship with the union. On the other hand, the union may want to take advantage of its initial position of strength and hence cross the legal and ethical limits of unionism. This is the time when management needs to formulate a clear strategy for dealing with union activities. It may decide to continue its initial policy of appeasement in the hope of maintaining harmony and avoiding conflict. This approach may help the management in the short run, but the union may learn to clinch concessions from management by resorting to strikes and agitations. In the long run therefore management may continue to lose in the power-game with the union. Alternatively, management may take a long-term view of union activities and decide to have a candid confrontation with it to make it understand that it has to operate within the prescribed limits of legitimate union activities. This decision may imply sacrifices on the part of management as well as the wider society. To this end, a struggle with the union may be inevitable, whatever the economic and other price it may have to pay in the process. When such a decision to fight it out is made, it has to be regarded as a situation of total conflict, and the management has to prepare itself fully with the logistics of the struggle as was done by the Anjali Bank management.
But the most crucial stage in the management's confrontation with the union is reached if and when the conflict is won. At this stage, the parties may continue their immediately preceding attitude of antagonism or may revert to the earlier attitude of fear or apathy. Here again, the decision has to be a managerial decision. It should be realized that while the conflict with the union was necessary in terms of managerial objective, it was not the management's objective to vanquish the union. Hence, as soon as the struggle is over, the managg^ : ment needs to move towards reconciliation ^in the awareness that the main organizational gipaffs of productivity or efficient service caffi be achieved only with the active help and co«opera-tion of employees. It should also be -realized that effective reconciliation needs to be eichieved not only at the top levels of management as well as union, but mainly at the level of branches or units where the majority of employees work. It needs considerable psyc hological adjustment and competence on the part of top management to go down to the grass-roots levels of industrial relations and work towards lasting reconciliation by admitting miistakes on both sides. However, such a move is managerially necessary as much as a "war" with the union is managerially necessary in another situation.
In industrial relations there are no permanent adversaries, either at individual or at group levels. There may be times when a conflict has to be managed bluntly on managerial issues and with the intention to achieve long-term managerial objectives. One hopes that managers in public and private enterprise will provide increasing evidence of ability and willingness to deal with problems of industrial relations with such clarity of managerial objectives and strategy.
If the analysis of data and conclusions presented in this paper give the reader the impression that the authors have made out a case for a one-sided strategy to deal with problems of industrial relations, the impression should now be corrected. The stress on a managerial strategy appearing in the above paragraphs is due to the fact that we approached the case under discussion from the point of view of management. If one were to examine similar data from the trade union's point of view, the need for a similar clarity of objectives and strategy on its part is evident.
